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     Abstract 
 
This article revises in the light of recent research a previously published and widely cited explanatory 
framework for considering public responses to wind farm developments (Bell et al. 2005).  In the preceding 
work, two gaps were distinguished: a ‘social gap’ between the high support for wind energy reported in 
surveys and the low success rate for wind farm applications; and an ‘individual gap’ whereby an individual 
supports wind energy in general but opposes a local wind farm (NIMBYism). The popular assumption that 
NIMBYism was the only explanation for the ‘social gap’ was contested. Instead, three explanations of the 
social gap were provided – democratic deficit; qualified support; and NIMBYism – and a range of different 
policy responses were suggested.  In this article, this analysis is re-visited in order to take account of the 
theoretical and empirical developments which have taken place since its publication. The original 
explanatory framework is expanded and revised and new conclusions are drawn about the likely causes of 
the ‘social gap’.  
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Introduction  
In 2005, we asked the question ‘if approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy, why is only 
a quarter of contracted wind power capacity actually commissioned?’ (Bell et al 2005, p. 460; henceforth SG1). 
We suggested that ‘NIMBYism’ was not likely to be a sufficient explanation for this ‘social gap’, and we 
proposed two additional explanations and discussed their implications for policy.  In this paper, we critically re-
visit our original argument in light of recent research.  In SG1, we explored the apparent disjunction between 
high support for wind energy and low installed capacity, a disjunction that we termed the ‘social gap’, and set 
out three explanations.   The Our first explanation was a ‘democratic deficit’ (SG1, p. 461), whereby the 
decision-making processes are dominated by the small number of unrepresentative wind farm opponents.   Our 
The second explanation for the social gap was that proponents are ‘qualified supporters’ of wind energy (SG1, p. 
463). So, while surveys report high levels of support, that support might actually be qualified or conditional in 
some way. Our The third explanation for the social gap was ‘self-interest’ or ‘NIMBYism’: people support wind 
farms but not in their backyard (SG1, p. 465.  We suggested that further empirical research to better understand 
the causes of the ‘social gap’ was important – not least because different policies for promoting wind energy 
would be appropriate depending upon different causes.  The aim of this paper is to re-visit the account of the 
‘social gap’ that we offered, review the evidence that has accumulated since SG1, and take forward our 
explanations for the gap between public support and siting success.  
The paper is divided into the following sections. First, we discuss the wider significance of the social 
gap. Second, we ‘re-measure’ the social gap. Third, we re-consider our explanations of the social gap and 
present a new framework for analysis. Fourth, we incorporate a revised typology of public attitudes into our 
framework. Finally, we reflect on relations of power in the local politics of wind energy, before our concluding 
remarks.  
 
1. The wider significance of the social gap   
In SG1, we presented the ‘social gap’ as a puzzle: why is there a low success rate in planning 
applications for wind  farms when there is such a high level of public support for wind energy? We continue to 
believe that understanding the causes of this social gap is important if the UK’s ambitious targets for wind 
energy capacity are to be achieved (DECC 2011). Moreover, it may have wider significance in two respects. 
 First, the social gap may not be confined to wind energy but may also apply to other forms of 
renewable energy, such as solar energy, hydroelectric energy and energy from biomass. Research suggests that 
there are high levels of public support in the UK for solar (87%) and hydroelectric (76%) and majority support 
for biomass (54%) (UEA/Mori 2005 cited in Pidgeon et al 2008, p. 75). However, the installed capacity of all 
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three types of energy remains relatively low (DECC 2012).
1
 More careful examination of the evidence could 
assess whether other forms of renewable energy experience a social gap.  If this is the case, any lessons from 
studying the social gap in wind energy politics may be more broadly applicable to other renewable energies .  
 Second, more ambitiously, the social gap may be a useful concept for thinking about the relationship 
between public opinion and political outcomes in democratic politics more generally. There may be many issues 
where majority public opinion – as reported in public opinion surveys – appears to favour an outcome that is not 
delivered by the political process. If so, the social gap issues may So, we might see cases where there is a social 
gap as prima facie problems for a polity that aspires to be democratic. The existence of a social gap on an issue 
is not just an issue for policy-makers seeking to promote a particular policy. It should also  be a prima facie 
concern for advocates of majoritarian democracy. 
 
2. ‘Re-measuring’ the social gap. 
In SG1, we introduced the social gap in the context of wind energy by claiming, following Toke 
(2002), that approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy in public opinion surveys but ‘only 
a quarter of contracted wind power capacity [is] actually commissioned’ (SG1, p. 460). Other authors have 
subsequently claimed that there is a ‘social gap’ in other countries, including the U.S. (Phadke 2011), New 
Zealand (Graham et al 2009) and Australia (Hindmarsh and Matthews 2008). However, the evidence base for 
these claims has been questioned. For example, Aitken argues that since ‘within the literature references to 
opinion polls and other surveys are typically brief’, therefore, the ‘basis for the prevailing belief that the 
majority of the public supports wind power remains largely unsubstantiated’ (2010a p. 1835). Moreover, she has 
also challenged the claim that the success rate in planning applications for wind energy is low (Aitken et al. 
2008). In this section, we briefly examine the available evidence for the UK. 
Whitmarsh et al. (2011, p.49) report that ‘nationally representative surveys have shown that, depending 
on the exact question asked, around 80% of the British population have favourable views of wind energy’. 
Whitmarsh et al. cite five surveys published between 2006 and 2008. The results of those surveys are presented 
in table 1 with data from two other nationally representative surveys conducted in 2003 and 2011, including the 
most recent Eurobarometer survey (March 2011) to ask about wind energy. Although dDifferent surveys ask 
different questions and allow different answers (see table 1), nevertheless . However, the data from these seven 
surveys supports the claim that a large majority of the UK public (approximately 80%) favour wind energy 
while approximately 50% ‘strongly’ favour wind energy. This provides support for the first part of the ‘social 
gap’ claim, namely, that opinion surveys show a consistently high level of public support for wind energy.2  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The second part of the social gap claim (that only 25% of proposed wind energy projects come to 
fruition) might be understood in more than one way. The relevant data could be the success rate in wind energy 
planning decisions; but this may be misleading because some applications might be withdrawn before decision 
or approved developments might not be built. Therefore, we should be interested in the installed capacity 
relative to the number of planning applications. We provide data on both.  
Table 2 presents data on the wind energy planning submissions, approvals and rejections and the 
number of developments built in the UK over the period 2004-10. The data shows that over 50% of applications 
that were decided in the period were approved. The success rate is much higher than the 25% that we claimed in 
SG1, suggesting that the gap between  high public support for wind energy and the success rate in planning 
decisions is much less than we thought. There is some evidence to suggest that the success rate in planning 
decisions may be higher now than it was up to 2001 (Toke 2005a). However, using this data, it seems that the 
social gap may never have been as large as we originally suggested – and may be smaller now.  
In contrast, if we compare data on the number of onshore wind planning applications submitted and the 
number of developments built in the period 2004-10, the social gap appears larger. In total, planning 
applications for 854 developments with a total capacity of 16921.33 MW were submitted but only 201 
developments were built with a total capacity of 3350.55 MW. So, the number of developments built was only 
23.5% of the number of applications submitted. Of course, it may be that some of the applications submitted 
may have been (or will be) built after 2010. However, it may also be that some applications were withdrawn or 
that developments that were approved were not built. So, as we might have expected, the data on installed 
                                                             
1
 At the end of 2011, the installed capacity for large scale hydro, plant biomass and solar energy in the UK was 1471MW, 
1159MW and 976MW, respectively (DECC 2012, p.47).  
2 Aitken (2010a) also raises questions about survey methods, epistemology and funder bias (see also Ellis et al. 2007 for a 
discussion of the limitations of survey based research). These are important questions that may lead us to question the 
significance of survey results – and, derivatively, the significance of the social gap – but they do not challenge the claim that 
opinion surveys show high levels of public support for wind energy.  
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capacity relative to planning applications suggests a larger social gap than the data on success rates in planning 
decisions. It is not clear that either interpretation provides an unproblematic account of the ‘outcomes’ of wind 
energy politics. However, both interpretations support – to varying extents – the claim that prima facie there is a 
gap between the ‘inputs’ (80% public support for wind energy) and the ‘outcomes’ of wind energy politics. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
3. Re-considering explanations of the social gap: a new framework for analysis 
In SG1, we distinguished three explanations of this social gap: democratic deficit; qualified support; 
and self-interest. The initial motivation for the paper was to contest the assumption that NIMBYism (or self-
interest) was the only plausible explanation of the social gap. Our aim was to explore the theoretical space for 
alternative explanations and to consider the different implications for policy of those alternative explanations. 
Our simple threefold typology of explanations has been widely cited (Wustenhagen et al. 2007, Wolsink 2007b, 
Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Devine-Wright 2009, Van der Horst and Toke 2010, Cowell et al. 2011). In 
most cases, our three alternative explanations have been reported as part of a more general review of the 
literature on wind energy politics (Barry et al. 2008, Eltham et al. 2008, Warren and Birnie 2009, Phadke 2010, 
Swofford and Slattery 2010, Evans et al. 2011, Jepson et al. 2012, Waldo 2012). More importantly, 
interestingly, in a few cases, our typology has been used to inform analysis of original empirical data (Jones and 
Eiser 2009, Sturzaker 2011). In these cases, the tendency has been to argue that the data supports the ‘qualified 
support’ explanation of the social gap (Jones and Eiser 2009, Sturzaker 2011). 
However, our typology of explanations has also been criticised. Agterbosch et al. (2009) argue that our 
threefold typology of explanations is problematic for two reasons. First, they ‘notice that these explanations are 
not mutually exclusive’ (2009, p. 205). Second, they claim that these three explanations ‘do not provide a proper 
picture of the complex and interactive nature of the formal public policy framework and social conditions at the 
operational level of implementation’ (2009, p. 405). In response to these criticisms, we have expanded and 
revised our explanatory framework.   
 In SG1, we were not clear about whether our three explanations of the social gap were mutually 
exclusive. On the one hand, we presented our three explanations as independent and competing accounts of the 
cause of the social gap. On the other hand, we ‘emphasised the importance of empirical research to examine the 
relative contribution of [these] explanations to the social gap’ (SG1, p. 474). Our apparent inconsistency 
reflected a problem with our account. We failed to adequately distinguish two aspects of each explanation. Each 
explanation addressed two distinct questions. First, what is the makeup of public opinion? Second, what are the 
relations of power in local wind energy politics? Disentangling these two questions helps us to address both of 
the concerns raised by Agterbosch et al.. 
First, disentangling the two questions helps us to understand how our three explanations are related to 
each other. The ‘self-interest’ and ‘qualified support’ explanations make competing claims about the makeup of 
public opinion. On one account, the majority of people are ‘NIMBYs’. On the other account, the majority of 
people are ‘qualified supporters’. The democratic deficit explanation also makes a claim about the makeup of 
public opinion: a minority of people are ‘unqualified opponents’ of wind energy. However, notice that this last 
claim is not inconsistent with the claims made about the makeup of public opinion in the other two explanations: 
the minority of people can be unqualified opponents and the majority of people can be qualified supporters (or 
NIMBYs). All three accounts also make claims about the relations of power in local wind energy politics. The 
democratic deficit explanation claims that power lies with the (minority) group of unqualified opponents. In 
contrast, the other two explanations both assume that power lies with the majority (who are either NIMBYs or 
qualified supporters). 
Second, distinguishing the two questions shows that our three explanations do not exhaust the logical 
space of alternative explanations for the social gap. Explanations can vary along two dimensions: the makeup of 
public opinion; and the relations of power in local wind energy politics. Our three explanations took very simple 
positions on each dimension. We might imagine many alternative explanations of the social gap that take more 
complex positions on each dimension. On the public opinion dimension, we might, for example, hypothesise 
that the makeup of public opinion could be such that there is no majority group but rather a plurality of qualified 
supporters and minority groups of NIMBYs, unqualified opponents and unqualified supporters. On the political 
power dimension, we might imagine that the relations of power between different stakeholders, including the 
public, developers, energy companies, non-governmental organisations, local authorities, planning inspectors, 
and central government departments, might not consistently or straightforwardly produce either majority rule or 
minority rule in the local politics of wind energy.  
In the next two sections, we consider what we can learn from the recent literature about the makeup of 
public opinion (Section 4) and the relations of power in the local politics of wind energy (Section 5).  
 
4. Revised typology of public attitudes 
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The public opinion surveys that we reported in Section 2 are based on an over-simplified typology of 
public attitudes: ranging from ‘strongly favour’ to ‘strongly oppose’. Similarly, popular media coverage of wind 
energy disputes is often based on a simplistic account of public attitudes: opponents of wind energy are 
NIMBYs (Jenkins 2012). In SG1, we offered an alternative typology of public attitudes, which included 
qualified supporters, NIMBYs and unqualified opponents – and suggested that they might be key actor ‘types’ 
in wind energy politics. In this section, we draw on the recent literature on public attitudes to wind energy to 
address two questions. First, does our typology of public attitudes require revision or refinement?  Second, what 
do we know about the relative proportions of different attitude ‘types’ in the UK population? 
 The recent literature suggests three refinements to our typology. First, we should revise our typology to 
include a new attitude type: the ‘place-protector’. This category draws theoretical inspiration from work in 
environmental psychology and geography on ‘place attachment’ (Devine-Wright, 2009, Devine-Wright, 2011, 
Devine-Wright and Howes, 2009). Place attachment is defined as ‘positively experienced bonds, sometimes 
occurring without awareness, that are developed over time from the behavioral, affective and cognitive ties 
between individuals and/or groups and their sociophysical environment’ (Brown and Perkins 1992, p. 284 cited 
in Devine-Wright 2012, p. 3). On this account, landscape concerns are not simply based on an aesthetic or visual 
appreciation of the landscape, but reflect the experience of living or spending time in a particular place. The 
‘place-protector’ is not a qualified supporter because she does not impose a universalisable qualification on her 
support for wind energy, such as wind farms should not be located in areas with particular landscape features.  
Neither is the ‘place-protector’ a NIMBY because she does not oppose local development for self-interested 
reasons. Instead, the ‘place-protector’ opposes a local development because of the value that she sees in that 
particular place while not seeing the same value or remaining agnostic on the value of other places where 
developments might take place.  
Recognising this new attitude type is practically important because the place-protector may respond 
differently from NIMBYs and qualified supporters to development policies and practices. For example, the 
place-protector may be less impressed than the NIMBY by financial incentives offered by developers. Similarly, 
the place-protector might understand the impact of ‘industrial’ or ‘technological’ developments in a place quite 
differently from someone whose concerns are purely about visual impact on a landscape (Pasqualetti, 2001, 
McLachlan 2009, 2010). 
 Second, we should refine our typology by distinguishing some of the different types of conditions that 
qualified supporters require acceptable developments to meet (for example in relation to noise – Haggett 2010, 
size – Warren and Birnie 2009, number – Barry and Chapman 2009, environmental protection – Graham et al 
2009, community involvement in decision making processes – Fisher and Brown 2009 and fair distribution of 
economic benefits – Aitken 2010b). Devine-Wright’s review of the literature identified 17 types of 
qualifications and categorised them into eight broad categories, including ‘physical’, ‘contextual’ and ‘local’ 
(Devine-Wright 2005, p. 135). This typology builds on previous work (e.g., Wolsink 2000) but provides a more 
systematic and comprehensive framework for classifying the reasons that people oppose developments.  It has 
been used by other researchers with some proposing refinements where their data has suggested gaps (Graham 
et al 2009). We believe that this is a useful strategy for developing a practical understanding of qualified 
support, which could be used by researchers (as well as policy-makers and developers) to analyse the detailed 
makeup of public opinion and the relative frequency of particular types of concern about wind energy. 
 Third, we should also refine our typology by recognising the importance of considering the 
relationships between the different types of conditions that qualified supporters impose on their support for 
wind energy. For example, Haggett and Futak-Campbell (2011) use discourse analysis to identify various 
discursive positions, such as ‘champions for the planet’, and ‘clean energy sceptics’, which include a range of 
inter-connected qualifications and views.  Similarly, Ellis et al. (2007) use q-methodology to distinguish four 
distinct objector discourses and four supporter discourses, and argue that ‘each objector discourse is constructed 
from a combination of different elements’ (2007, p531). We believe that our understanding might be 
significantly enhanced by applying q-methodology or discourse analysis to a much larger dataset based on 
interviews with a statistically representative sample of the population. If we could categorise qualified 
supporters based on the clusters of conditions that they believe developments should meet, we could determine 
which types of qualified supporters are likely to be relatively easy to satisfy with well-designed developments 
proposals and which are likely to be very rarely satisfied by a development proposal.   
 Based on our reading of the recent literature on attitudes to wind energy, we have suggested three 
revisions or refinements to our typology of attitudes. The second question that we want to address is: What do 
we already know about the relative proportions of different attitude ‘types’ in the UK population? A critical 
reading of the recent literature suggests three provisional conclusions. 
 First, much of the social science literature on wind energy argues that the NIMBY label oversimplifies 
and mischaracterises local opposition to wind energy developments (Warren and Birnie 2009, Aitken 2010a, 
Jessup 2010, Haggett 2011), and we agree that this is indeed the case when the label is used as a simple 
descriptor for all and any protest (e.g., Feldman and Turner 2010). It  has  been argued that we should study how 
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advocates of wind energy use ‘NIMBY’ discursively to de-legitimise opponents of wind energy but we should 
not study whether opponents are NIMBYs (Burningham 2000, Wolsink 2006).  We agree that it is important to 
study the discursive use of ‘NIMBY’ in wind energy politics (Haggett and Toke 2006) but we still believe it 
matters whether some people oppose local wind energy developments for self-interested reasons but are willing 
to support developments elsewhere that might affect other people in the same way. The self-interested NIMBY 
is probably relatively rare but the evidence is less conclusive than much of the literature suggests because most 
studies have not been designed to distinguish NIMBYs from place-protectors or qualified supporters.  
Moreover, For example, small-n qualitative studies based on interviews with protagonists in wind energy 
disputes (e.g., Waldo 2012) cannot conclusively show that NIMBYs do not exist because they may simply be 
missing from the small sample. 
Furthermore, studies which examine people’s concerns about wind farms often argue that their data 
shows opposition is based on landscape effects (Jessup 2010) or concerns about procedural or distributive 
fairness (Gross 2007) rather than self-interested reasons. However, while this suggests that the number of 
NIMBYs is small, it does not show that there are no NIMBYs. In contrast, some studies do identify what appear 
to be concerns connected to economic self-interest, such as the negative effects of wind farms on house prices 
(Barry et al 2008; Jones and Eiser 2009, Upham 2009). However, these studies do not show that the respondents 
are NIMBYs. If, for example, a respondent believes that wind energy developments should go ahead only if 
they do not have a significant negative effect on the price of either the respondent’s house or anyone else’s 
house, they are a qualified supporter of wind energy not a NIMBY. The NIMBY is a self-interested free-rider 
who is not concerned about the negative effects of wind energy developments on other people.  
To summarise, there is no conclusive evidence in the literature that there are people who hold the 
combination of attitudes that are associated with NIMBYism. However, this may be due to the absence of 
research that could demonstrate the existence of NIMBYs. We only know that if there are any NIMBYs they are 
likely to be a small proportion of the population nationally.  
  The second provisional conclusion that we draw from the recent literature is that concerns about the 
landscape effects of developments are most common among and often most important for opponents of wind 
farms (Smith and Klick 2007, Jones and Eiser 2010, Jessup 2010). However, we do not know whether those 
who express landscape concerns are qualified supporters or place-protectors. Some discussions assume that 
those who express landscape concerns are qualified supporters (e.g., Hindmarsh and Matthews 2008) while 
others regard them as place-protectors (Devine-Wright 2009, McLachlan 2009, 2010). We could only separate 
the two attitude types by looking in more detail at how they express their concerns about landscape/place and by 
examining their attitudes to local and non-local proposed developments. For example, if someone identifies 
generic features of landscapes that make them unsuitable for wind farms in both local and non-local places, it 
would seem appropriate to classify them as a qualified supporter. In contrast, if someone appeals to the 
specialness of their local place and makes different judgements about proposed local and non-local 
developments, which (might generally be agreed to) have similar features, it may be appropriate to classify them 
as a place-protector.  
 Our third provisional conclusion is that concerns about fairness are also very common and often very 
important for qualified supporters of wind energy (Gross 2007, Haggett 2008). Opponents of wind energy 
developments often highlight both the unfairness of the process of decision-making about developments and the 
unfairness of the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with developments (Gross 2007, Fisher and 
Brown 2009). Concerns about procedural fairness may be especially significant where a major energy company 
proposes a development and local people feel that they have not been consulted at an early stage about the 
proposed development or have not had an opportunity to influence the siting process (Agterbosch et al. 2009). 
However, recent research has also shown that concerns about procedural fairness can arise in community-led 
developments when some members of the community feel that they have been excluded from the decision-
making process (**REF**).  
Concerns about distributive fairness may be raised in relation to both burdens and benefits. First, the 
concentration of developments in particular geographical areas may raise concerns about whether the landscape 
and other costs associated with hosting wind energy developments are being distributed fairly between different 
communities (Haggett forthcoming). Second, the distribution of the benefits of wind energy developments may 
be considered unfair if local communities (or some members of local communities) receive little or no benefits 
while developers and energy companies make large profits, landowners are paid annual rents for the use of their 
land for siting wind turbines, and consumers elsewhere in the country use more energy than the communities 
hosting developments (Jobert et al. 2007).  
Developers have increasingly acted to address the concerns of this type of qualified supporter by 
seeking to engage local communities earlier in the siting process and by offering ‘community benefits’ packages 
to local communities (Aitken 2010b; Cowell et al 2011). However, the existing research provides only a limited 
picture of the principles (and practices) of procedural and distributive fairness that qualified supporters are most 
likely to require developments to satisfy. So, there is more to learn about the relative frequency and importance 
Comment [J1]: I have material on 
people feeling excluded from the decision 
making process but not specifically in the 
context of a community-led development 
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of different types of fairness-related conditions that qualified supporters place on their support for wind energy 
developments.  
 In this section, we have proposed revisions to our typology of attitudes to wind energy and presented 
some provisional conclusions about the makeup of public opinion. We believe that the evidence suggests that 
there are large numbers of qualified supporters of wind energy (who are concerned especially about landscape 
and fairness), some place-protectors (but we do not know how many of those concerned about landscape/place 
are place-protectors and how many are qualified supporters), a small number of unqualified opponents (who 
indicate that they are ‘strongly opposed’ to wind energy in surveys), and there may be a small number of 
NIMBYs (but the evidence remains inconclusive). 
 
5. Relations of power in the local politics of wind energy 
 
 In SG1, we offered an over-simplified account of the relations of power in the local politics of wind 
energy by considering only two alternatives: majority rule and minority rule. In this section, we propose a more 
sophisticated approach to the democratic deficit explanation, which uses a new institutionalist theoretical 
framework to analyse relations of power among members of the public with different attitude types and among 
other stakeholders, including developers, local authorities, environmental groups, local planning officers, 
planning inspectors and central government departments (Bruekers and Wolsink 2007). We outline four general 
conclusions that we believe are suggested by the recent literature. 
 First, local members of the public can and do block or delay wind energy developments. The power of 
local communities is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g., Bruekers and Wolsink 2007, Eltham et al. 
2008, Graham et al. 2009, Jones and Eiser 2009, 2010, Phadke 2011). For example, Righter (2002, p. 37) claims 
that ‘small numbers of dedicated opponents can and will attack projects, crushing developers with their passion’. 
Less dramatically, Swofford and Slattery (2010, p. 2517) assert that ‘the attitudes of those living in close 
proximity to a wind farm project have a strong effect on planning [applications]’. As Righter (2002) suggests, 
local opponents may not even need to be large in number. If they are well motivated, well-resourced and 
strategically astute, they may be able to influence local planning officers or local councillors so that a 
development is delayed or even blocked. In saying this, we are endorsing a revised version of the democratic 
deficit explanation that we offered in SG1. Our original version hypothesised that a minority group of 
unconditional opponents of wind energy might have the power to block developments. Our revised claim is that 
a minority group of local members of the public – which might be made up of unqualified opponents or 
qualified supporters (who do not believe this development meets the right conditions) or place-protectors or 
even NIMBYs or, most likely, will include people with different attitudes to wind energy – will often have the 
power to block developments. 
However, the assumption that local opponents are able to block developments has been challenged in 
the UK (Aitken et al 2008) and in several other countries, including Australia (Hindmarsh and Matthews 2008), 
Spain (Zografos and Martinez-Alier 2009) and Sweden (Waldo 2012). In the UK context, Aitken has argued 
that local campaigns may delay wind farm projects by persuading local councils to refuse planning permission 
but they do not block them because developers invariably challenge the local decision and planning permission 
is usually granted after a public inquiry (Aitken et al 2008, Aitken 2009, 2010c). Warren and Birnie (2009, 
p.107) suggest that Aitken’s argument is ‘supported by the fact that over 90% of planning applications for 
onshore wind farms [in Scotland] are approved’.3 
It may be that Aitken’s assessment of the limited power of local opponents is correct in Scotland 
(where the data suggests that there is not a significant gap between public opinion and success for wind energy 
developments in the planning process). However, as we saw earlier, the success rate of developers in planning 
decisions has been lower in the UK as a whole (Table 2). Moreover, data collected by van der Horst and Toke 
(2010, p. 215) on wind energy planning applications in England between 1991 and 2006 suggests that out of the 
37 applications rejected by local authorities only 8 had been approved on appeal.
4
 So, opponents do not appear 
to be powerless at the appeal stage. Moreover, there is significant evidence from case studies that successful 
campaigns against proposed developments are usually led by people living in close proximity to them (Swofford 
and Slattery 2010, Kaldellis et al. 2012). 
 Our second conclusion is that some local communities may be more likely to be successful in blocking 
developments than others. There is some evidence that wind energy developments are more likely to be rejected 
on appeal when they are proposed in communities where there is higher life expectancy, higher voter turnout in 
national elections, lower health deprivation, more people working in the private sector, and more second and 
holiday homes (van der Horst and Toke 2010). The suggestion here is that local opposition is more likely to be 
successful when it is better resourced – economically, legally, technically and in terms of social and political 
                                                             
3 Warren and Birnie are quoting data from Toke 2005. 
4 They report that 2 further appeals were still outstanding at the time of data collection. 
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capital. More empirical studies would be required to confirm this conclusion but it seems consistent with new 
institutionalist analyses of the important role of a wide range of different types of resources in relations of 
power.  
 The third conclusion that we draw from the recent literature is that local opponents are not the only 
significant opponents of wind energy developments. Indeed, it may be that other stakeholders, in particular, 
nature or landscape conservation groups, may exercise as much or more power in the local politics of wind 
energy (**refs?**). For example, Toke (2005a, p.1536) has argued that ‘the Council for the Protection of Rural 
Wales (CPRW) has a policy of objecting to proposed wind farm schemes as a matter of standard policy’. 
Conservation groups have the necessary financial, legal and knowledge resources, and have well-rehearsed 
strategies for opposing wind energy developments (Haggett and Futak-Campbell 2011). Co-operation among 
different kinds of opponents of a particular wind energy development, which enables the pooling of resources 
and the use of mixed strategies that seek to influence decision-making through various channels, may be more 
likely to succeed. More detailed empirical studies of a large number of cases would be necessary to confirm this 
conclusion but it is consistent with new institutionalist analyses of the importance of network resources in 
relations of power.  
 Our fourth conclusion is that the relations of power in the local politics of wind energy are significantly 
altered when there is active local support for a ‘community’ wind energy scheme (Barry and Chapman 2009, 
Rogers et al. 2008). A common argument is that the amount of installed wind energy capacity in the UK would 
be increased by encouraging small scale, community-led developments (Warren and Birnie 2009, Warren and 
McFayden 2010). This argument is often supported by appealing to the experience of other countries, such as 
Denmark (Toke 2005b, Toke et al 2008). However, more recent research in the UK has problematised the 
notion of ‘community’ wind energy (Walker and Devine-Wright 2008). Community wind schemes will not 
always enjoy unanimous – or even majority – support in the local community (**ref**). Instead, community 
schemes may be developed by small groups of local activists, sometimes in collaboration with local authorities 
or larger wind energy developers (*ref* is this right?*). As a result, ‘community’-led schemes may be as 
controversial in the local community as developments proposed by multinational energy companies (**REF**). 
More research would be required to properly understand how different features of different kinds of 
‘community’-led schemes aeffect the relations of power in the local politics of wind energy but we can be 
confident that the involvement of local pro-wind activists will often have an impact – even if it remains an open 
question whether ‘community’-led schemes are an effective way of increasing installed wind energy capacity in 
the UK. 
  In this section, we have presented four conclusions about the relations of power in the local politics of 
wind energy in the UK, which have significantly refined our democratic deficit explanation. We believe that the 
institutional rules governing wind energy planning applications allow some well-resourced local opponents with 
strong commitments (supported by well-networked and well-resourced national interest groups) to effectively 
oppose developments. So, the opponents of any particular wind energy development may be a minority 
nationally and even locally but they might still be able to successfully block the development. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim in SG1 was to contest the suggestion that NIMBYism or self-interest was the only explanation for the 
gap between the high level of public support for wind energy in opinion surveys and the relatively low level of 
installed wind energy capacity in the UK. We proposed two alternative explanations: the majority of the public 
are qualified supporters and they determine the outcome of wind energy planning applications; or a minority of 
the public are unqualified opponents and they determine the outcome of wind energy planning applications. In 
this article, we have re-asserted our belief that the social gap is politically significant and we have provided 
more data to support its existence and clarify its size. More importantly, we have acknowledged that our original 
explanatory framework was too simple to capture the range of possible explanations of the social gap.  
We have re-interpreted the three explanations that we previously offered in a new theoretical 
framework, which distinguishes two questions: What is the makeup of public opinion on wind energy? What are 
the relations of power in the local politics of wind energy? We believe that any explanation of the social gap 
should provide answers to both questions. The answer it offers to the first question should provide a critical 
perspective on the results of standard public opinion surveys that show 80% of the public in the UK support 
wind energy. The answer it offers to the second question should provide a better understanding of who blocks 
wind energy developments and under what conditions they are able to do so. Together, these two answers 
should explain the social gap. 
 In this revised article, Our review of the recent literature suggests some provisional conclusions but 
although we still do not claim to have offered a definitive explanation of the social gap, we. We believe that it 
the social gap is most likely to be a consequence of two factors. First, the evidence suggests that there are large 
numbers of qualified supporters and (some) place protectors as well as a few unqualified opponents and, 
perhaps, some self-interested NIMBYs, who may all work together to oppose particular wind energy 
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developments. So, it seems likely to be a mistake to try to explain the social gap by reference to the actions (or 
power) of people with any single attitude type (as we did in SG1 with each of our three explanations). Second, 
the institutional rules governing wind energy planning applications allow some well-resourced local opponents 
with strong commitments, supported by well-networked and well-resourced national interest groups, to 
effectively oppose developments. So, the opponents of any particular wind energy development may be a 
minority nationally and even locally but they might still be able to successfully block that development.  
 Finally, we want to suggest two areas for further research that might ‘deepen’ our understanding of the 
causes of the social gap, while also providing policy-makers with more useful guidance on how the gap might 
be closed and the level of installed wind energy increased. First, if many people are qualified supporters and 
most qualified supporters are concerned about landscape and fairness, the key to understanding, and potentially 
reducing, the social gap may lie in developing a better account of the detailed character of these concerns and 
the relations between them. For example, how do people value landscapes or places and in what ways do wind 
energy developments pose a threat to the value of landscapes or places? Similarly, what conceptions of 
procedural and distributive fairness tend to inform people’s concerns about wind energy developments and what 
is required to avoid (perceived) unfairness? And, how are different landscape/place-based concerns related to 
different fairness concerns? If we can answer these questions, we might better understand (in psychological 
terms) the causes of the social gap. Moreover, it might be clearer how policy-makers and developers could 
choose potential development sites and design development processes that would be less likely to be opposed by 
a significant number of qualified supporters. Second, we might seek to better understand the conditions that 
make effective co-operation among opponents possible. For example, is effective opposition dependent on local 
opponents having the resources that come with living in a relatively affluent community? In what circumstances 
can developers prevent effective opposition by offering a community benefits package? If we can answer 
questions of this type, we might better understand (in new institutionalist terms) the causes of the social gap. 
Moreover, it might be clearer what policy-makers and developers could do to reduce the social gap by 
accommodating or avoiding opposition. 
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Table 1. National opinion surveys on wind energy (2003-2011) 
Date Survey No. of 
people 
surveyed 
Question Answer format Results 
2003 TNS  
for DTI 
1279 What is your opinion of 
using onshore wind to 
generate electricity? 
 
 
 
What is your opinion of 
using offshore wind to 
generate electricity? 
Five options: ‘a 
very good idea’, ‘a 
fairly good idea’, 
‘neither a good idea 
nor a bad idea’, ‘a 
fairly bad idea’ or 
‘a very bad idea’. 
Onshore:  
49% a very 
good idea 
86% good idea 
(fairly or very) 
 
Offshore: 
51% a very 
good idea 
84% good idea 
(fairly or very) 
2006 Poortinga  
et al.  
1491 How favourable or 
unfavourable are your 
overall opinions or 
impressions of 
the following energy 
sources for producing 
electricity currently..?  
Wind Energy. 
Five options: ‘Very 
favourable’, 
‘Mainly 
favourable’, 
‘Neither favourable 
nor unfavourable’, 
‘Mainly 
unfavourable’ or 
‘Very 
unfavourable’.  
50% very 
favourable 
81% favourable 
(mainly or 
very) 
2006 DTI 2032 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
54% agree 
strongly 
81% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
2006 Eurobarometer 
65.3 
1337 Are you in favour or 
opposed to the use of 
these different sources of 
energy in the UK?  Wind 
Energy 
Seven-point scale 
from ‘strongly 
opposed’ (1) to 
‘strongly in favour’ 
(7) 
44% strongly 
in favour (7) 
78% in favour 
(5, 6 or 7) 
 
Average score 
5.7 
2007 BERR 1970 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
54% agree 
strongly 
82% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
2008 BERR 2047 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
50% agree 
strongly 
80% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
14 
 
2011 Eurobarometer 
75.1 
1322 To what extent are you in 
favour of or opposed to 
the use of the following 
sources of energy in the 
UK?  Wind Energy 
Four options: 
‘Strongly in 
favour’, ‘Fairly in 
favour’, ‘Fairly 
opposed’ and 
‘strongly opposed’ 
61% strongly 
in favour 
91% in favour 
(fairly or 
strongly)  
Source: DTI 2003, Poortinga et al 2006, DTI 2006, Eurobarometer 65.3 2006, BERR 2007, BERR 2008, 
Eurobarometer 75.1 2011. 
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Table 2. Onshore wind farm developments in the UK (2004-2010) 
Source: BWEA 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Submitted 79 
(2874.81 
MW) 
95 
(2485.13 
MW) 
123 
(2162.65 
MW) 
122 
(1901.68 
MW) 
149 
(2080.95 
MW) 
138 
(3040.81 
MW) 
148 
(2114.33 
MW) 
Approved 31  
(635.13 
MW) 
40  
(671.56 
MW) 
38  
(876.55 
MW) 
63 
(1141.47 
MW) 
72 
(1766.43 
MW) 
98 
(1322.57 
MW) 
83  
(1351.14 
MW) 
Rejected  28  
(279.65 
MW) 
29  
(674.45 
MW) 
31 
(668.90 
MW) 
48  
(868.58 
MW) 
52 
(1578.10 
MW) 
67  
(759.95 
MW) 
84  
(1245.03 
MW) 
Built  11 
(181.14 
MW) 
22  
(369.73 
MW) 
21  
(531.50 
MW) 
28  
(359.25 
MW) 
41 
 (557.45 
MW) 
39 
(812.13 
MW) 
39 
 (539.35 
MW) 
